Welfare Theory: A Critique of Concepts by Sandemose, Jørgen
61 
Welfare Theory: A Critique of Concepts 
Jørgen Sandemose 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Oslo  
PO Box 1020 Blindern, N – 0315 Oslo, Norway 
E-mail: jorgen.sandemose@ifikk.uio.no 
Abstract: 
In this paper, the author contends that the notion of a ‘welfare state’ cannot be regarded as 
a meaningful concept unless it is thought of as an ideological construction. Important elements in 
that construction are traced back to T. R. Malthus, whom the author holds to be the decisive figure 
in the build-up of the paradigm of bourgeois social science dominating up to the present day. 
“Welfare” politics are analysed as a reflection of the accumulation of capital, and severe criticism is 
made of concepts like “commodification” and “de-commodification”, as they are being commonly 
used in “welfare theory”. 
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As a concept, the “welfare state” first met daylight in 1939. It was formed as a counter-
concept to the expression “warfare state”. However, it had been foreshadowed by expressions like 
“welfare manager”, “welfare policy”, “welfare work” and “welfare centres” – all of them conceived 
in the years between the two Russian revolutions. The “welfare” addition to the vocabulary was 
indeed a consequence of the fact that new kinds of mass participation in bourgeois politics had made 
words like “charity”, or expressions like “poor relief”, unacceptable in public discourse (Williams 
1976, 281). 
This background of political tactics suggests that the expression “welfare state” simply does 
not represent a concept, in the full and traditional meaning. A “welfare state” is primarily an 
ideological construction. Taken as a real reference, it never existed under conditions of modernity. 
If one were not aware of the needs that make such constructions possible and necessary, one might 
be justified in feeling shocked by the superficiality with which “philosophers”, historians, 
economists and sociologists unanimously use the expression without ever explaining or justifying it. 
Instead, one should regard this calamity as a token of an oppressive society as well-endowed with 
mechanisms fitted to conceal its own true content, as with plethoral money to finance the academic 
foundations of a silence.  
I. Welfare as class warfare 
However, even if one adopts a Marxian definition of the state as a product of the 
implacability of class antagonisms, it will not be a priori nonsensical to talk of a “welfare state”. On 
Humanities Bulletin, Volume 1, Number 2, 2018 
62 
the contrary, such a term will have definite meaning if applied, for instance, to the Greek city-state 
of Athenian type, where the system of oppression is tied to the existence of liturgies, in which the 
social superiority is expressed explicitly through relations which give the inferior a formal guarantee 
of welfare (eudaimonia) distributed from above. In principle, something similar could be said of the 
feudal states of Europe. 
Now, these types of “welfare state” are related to ideas of elitism as well as to existent picks 
that are popularly thought to distribute welfare in their capacity of being naturally superior. The so-
called modern society, that is, bourgeois society, is a community based on presuppositions that are 
(and were) antagonistic to such constructions. These presuppositions, whose mode of existence is a 
deep-rooted, Christian inspired, popular conviction of the equality between all men, are partly based 
on an illusion: the status equality between all members of the bourgeois class is ideologically 
projected to all members of society. Still, such a projection has been possible only because of the fact 
that this same society is pervaded by a real similarity between all its members, namely, their formal 
freedom. To take the most important case: The formal freedom of the workers, and a fortiori of all 
strata of the working population, is itself real, and a necessary prerequisite for the functioning of 
the economic base of society itself. The selling and buying of labour power cannot be present 
without it. 
Under such circumstances, it should go without saying that the concept of a ‘welfare state’ 
is purely ideological: the state is an apparatus of oppression, so that its possible “welfare” character 
would have to be of an elitist kind; but such a kind of reference for the concept of ‘welfare’ is 
unrealistic, as long as the state is bourgeois. Rather, it is of vital importance that this latter kind of 
state cover up its oppressive character.  
The conclusion is thus rather that the notion of a ‘welfare state’ is very well fitted to veil a 
certain kind of oppression. It mirrors a society whose authoritarian, yet anti-elitist feature, a gift 
from the Reformation, makes it possible gradually to transfer insurance-based welfare benefits from 
the family (and related corporations) to the state, thus creating the erosion of the family institutions 
which latter-day Protestants persistently use in their political agitation against that state. 
There is still more to gain from a comparison between the bourgeois state and pre-capitalist 
state forms. The state is always meant to be, and is always thought of as being, the prime upholder 
of internal peace and order; it is, also, in itself always the result of specific historical processes – 
processes of a kind that make the state an entity with a vital connection to those phenomena that we 
traditionally describe with the rather unapt term “social change”. 
Pre-capitalist (or pre-modern) societies, like the Greek poleis or the social network of the 
European feudal system, could be termed “natural economies” in comparison with bourgeois 
society. As has rightly been said (Marx), the historical development of such economic forms is based 
on foundations laid by nature itself (climate, fertility, power sources) – as opposed to the bourgeois 
form, whose development is characterised by historically created elements. 
Now, the specific natural element which has the prime significance to politics and the state 
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is the mass of human population itself: its change, growth or decline are results of the connection of 
human fertility with the source of labour power, which in its turn is the principal power source, 
generally speaking. It is a mass making up the very essence of the productive forces, as well as the 
core of the relations of production: every human being is a potential owner as well as a potential 
worker. 
The overall importance of relative over- or under-population in primitive types of society is 
seen in the crucial consequences of plagues and famines, in colonisation movements, in wars of 
conquest, in the genocidal practices of twentieth-century Central Africa and Cambodia as well as of 
fourteenth-century Central Asia. It is ideologically reflected in sayings of Oliver Cromwell and Pol 
Pot as well as in writings of Plato and Aristoteles. 
In pre-capitalist societies, the dominating tendency is towards conservatism in technological 
development, and consequently to uphold, or even to reduce, a given rate of survival. This fact 
decisively influences the corresponding definition of, and actual practices of, the (pre-modern) state. 
The fundamental change of paradigm in the history of the state institution is thus seen in the 
ideology of the mercantilist state from the sixteenth century onwards. Here, population growth is 
considered a goal in itself – a fact that reflects the dawn of a new mode of production, and, inserted 
therein, of new relations of domination, where the old ties of dependence and obligation are 
vanishing, to be eventually substituted by the relation between capital and wage labour. 
Great weight could be put on population growth only because there now existed a powerful 
state apparatus, which was in the position to abstract from the suffering of the masses, and 
mercilessly to further the production of human beings regardless of their eventual destiny – as wage 
earners or as paupers and vagabonds. However, this reliance on the pure and mere existence of 
human beings in the course of the development of bourgeois society was to undergo a 
transformation to the kind of humanism we know from the Enlightenment. And with the 
introduction of large-scale industry and disciplined work processes, the bourgeoisie, through men 
like Kant and Hegel, even adapted theories that essentially postulated a real, not just formal, equality 
between all possible members of society. 
However, the peak performance of this kind of philosophy coincided with the first class-
conscious revolts of wage-earners. The ensuing fear in the propertied classes led them to seek 
comfort in Kierkegaardian concepts of Dread, in existentialist, Kafkaian-Freudian concepts of 
Death, or in Darwinian-Malthusian concepts of death rates. 
In the course of time, however, the ruling classes gained consciousness of the necessity of 
building up a welfare superstructure that would be able to justify public expenses designed to keep 
the working population in check (that last term should be especially noted), and possibly to divert 
it from revolutionary aims to a worldview of a reformist-utilitarian kind of socialism. From these 
decades springs the upper-class socialism of Europe, developed from the utopianism of Saint-Simon, 
Fourier, and Owen, fostering individuals whose high-spirited aloofness was perhaps the only factor 
that could ensure them a political momentum. 
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In fact, the summit of bourgeois philosophical and analytical thinking, which had been 
reached by Kant, Hegel, Smith, and Ricardo, had resulted from the smashing of the pre-capitalist 
paradigm, which rated population magnitude as an independent, determining. And with the 
vanishing of this paradigm, albeit it was “true ideology” for times now gone, humankind’s theory of 
its own life for the first time really saw the light. And what it felt, without seeing it clearly (for the 
light is the most difficult thing ever to apprehend), was that the working population, as Marx was 
to point out, was no longer to be thought of as an independent variable, setting limits to the growth 
of social wealth. On the contrary, the magnitude of capital, privately owned wealth accumulated 
through alienated labour, had become an independent variable, making population size a dependent 
one (cf Marx 1968, chapter 23). 
Thus an implicit experience made by members of the capitalist class was that the liberating 
paradigm was a dangerous one. If it pointed out society’s relative independence of the natural 
growth in the mass of its members, it at the same time stigmatised society’s dependence on 
exploitation of alienated labour. But such a relation of dependence implies that economic crises are 
necessary ingredients of this same society. That insight was de facto propagated by Ricardo, in his 
last edition of the Principles. Though he felt reassured of its benefit for landlord and capitalist, he 
professed himself “convinced that the substitution of machinery for human labour is often very 
injurious to the interests of the class of labourers” (Ricardo 1969, 264). This was too much for the 
“manufacturing classes”. Evidently, Ricardo’s insight cannot be taken as a lone stroke of genius; 
rather, it was the authorised last drop in the overfilling of the glass, full of experiences of rick-burning 
and machine-breaking, culminating with Peterloo: it reflected a general mood already existing, the 
spectacle of the bourgeois’ understanding of his own mode of production going asunder. There 
came to the fore an immediate need for a reversing of the paradigm.  
 
II. Paradigm lost, paradigm hidden 
In fact, a reversing model had already shown itself. The need for it had evolved gradually. In 
the theory of T. R. Malthus, an apparent revival of the pre-bourgeois population paradigm was to 
be made salonfähig for bourgeois “science”. Malthus’ theory of basic tendencies in population 
development, of misery, vice, check and moral restraint, has dominated bourgeois “social science” 
from about 1830 to this day. Or rather, its use, often disguised or unconscious, has been the one 
feature that decisively has branded the user as a bourgeois ideologist. 
The social theorist who to a higher degree than any other worked out the conceptual 
framework of the politics of a “welfare state”, J. M. Keynes, once wrote that “if only Malthus, instead 
of Ricardo, had been the parent stem from which nineteenth-century economists proceeded, what 
a much wiser and richer place the world would be today” (Keynes 1972, 106 sq.).  But Keynes, in all 
his admiration for Malthus, was wrong as regarded the impact of the latter’s ideas on bourgeois 
theory. In fact, it was the Malthusian paradigm that changed that theory into an ideology. 
And, curiously, neither Karl Marx, albeit all his contempt for Malthus, and albeit he made a 
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reasonably detailed study of his economic theory, apparently did capture this point. In the time 
passing since his death, things have evolved which make that an easier task. 
Now, it is fairly clear that Keynes misunderstood Malthus’ special theory of money and 
distribution. But the important thing in Malthus is, as has been said, the turning of a fundamental 
paradigm. 
As is well known, this paradigm has the form of Newtonian lawmaking: Malthus’ 
population law presupposes the possibility of a geometrical growth in population and of an 
arithmetical one in agricultural output. Of course, these axioms do not pretend to describe what 
happens in history, but what would be the case if forces did not operate which were counteracting 
the tendencies expressed by the axioms. 
As counteracting forces Malthus reckoned periodically accelerated death rates and/or 
reduced birth rates, and, secondarily, restraint from marriage as well as from intercourse outside it. 
The first of these “checks” (as he called them) has periodically been adapted as a conscious political 
means, in ways Malthus could not reasonably have foreseen. The latter two can to some degree be 
conciliated with liberal, bourgeois politics. It is worth noting that the introduction of “welfare” 
ideology in the Nordic countries was accompanied by “sexual enlightenment” campaigns as a most 
important feature. That this alleged enlightenment also took the form of authoritarian eugenics, 
seems by now to be a generally accepted fact. Examples are legio from national politics all over 
Europe. But as soon as this kind of benevolent “socialism from above” is reproduced on the arena 
of international politics, even more spectacular consequences show up. When Keynes in 1914 
condemned the military rivalry in Europe, he did not mean it as a polemic against imperialist wars, 
but against their apparent current issues. According to Keynes, the “white nations” rather would 
need to protect themselves against the higher fecundity of “non-whites”, even to the point of waging 
“racial wars”, wars which, this time, would be about “substantial issues” (Keynes 1914, Skidelsky 
1992, 429 sq.). 
It is worth noting that Keynes did not propose to accelerate the birth rate of “whites”. 
Evidently, such a means would run counter to the propagandistic heritage of nineteenth-century 
(neo-)Malthusianism, to the effect that the working population show the self-discipline of keeping 
its numbers in check, adequate to the needs of capital. It is, indeed, precisely this heritage which 
accounts for, and partly consists in, the flourishing of “scientific” eugenics and of Freudian “psycho-
analysis”, which essentially was born out of an agitation for sexual self-discipline. 
From Malthus is derived a kind of vulgar economy whose conceptual framework soon came 
to function as a paradigm for the whole bourgeois social science. It is a paradigm of bourgeois self-
criticism: not only is the world not perfect; there is also no principle of perfection inherent in it. 
(Malthus’ argument against utopistic utilitarianism (Godwin) is the same that Darwin later used 
against Lamarck.) The ruling class, fundamentally, is not in any position to create progress, let alone 
to secure social stability. To effectuate such tasks, it needs assistance of working-class organisations 
and institutions. On the other hand, to the enlightened observer the working class appears like a 
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rude, ignorant crowd – a populace to be feared, as Kierkegaard (significantly the founder of most 
latter-day bourgeois “philosophic” thought) had it, when he wrote that “a crowd in its very concept 
is the untruth”. It, therefore, had to be refined and educated by picks with bourgeois or aristocratic 
origins.  
The history of capitalism in the twentieth century evolved from such a kind of “class” co-
operation. Its nineteenth-century forerunners were also distinctively Malthusian: movements for 
education and enlightenment (adapted, of course, to reformist aims), for hygienic improvement, for 
“social” housebuilding, and temperance movements, which in Protestant countries were the most 
important of them all.  
From the outset, the Malthusian paradigm was an individualistic one: Social improvement, 
always dependent on procreation control, should be a result of moral restraint on part of individuals. 
In the “welfare societies”, such a restraint is thought to be the responsibility of individuals connected 
to a class. This corollary should not surprise anyone: the paradigm does not deny the existence of 
classes; rather, that concept is as vital to it as is the concept of restraint. The classes, particularly the 
purely working one, are (is) thought of as centre(s) of propaganda for restraint among their (its) 
individual members, and the paradigm takes the form of a will to ensure social restraint in all relevant 
areas. Of course, this goes particularly for those relating to the direct opposition to capital; 
“moderation” in demands on working conditions and wages thus becomes an essential paradigmatic 
element. 
The main point is that the “welfare state” does not introduce a state of welfare, but a state 
that makes possible the transfer of certain benefits to a majority of the population, and which 
smoothly – because of its connection with working-class institutions – allows withdrawal of claims 
to those benefits. 
Consequently, it is in no way paradoxical that the founder of the way of thought that led to 
the conception of a “welfare state”, was also the one who most vehemently rejected any proposal to 
the effect that the population had any right to “welfare”. On this point, the uncompromising 
Malthus has got his way: where there is welfare to be found, it should always be possible to remove 
it. (Quite consistently, he developed a theory of “effective demand”, recommending public works 
in the depression following the Napoleonic Wars.) 
As has been said, the conviction of the existence of a fundamental equality between all men 
is a necessary prerequisite of the capitalist order. This conviction can only be nourished on the basis 
of some degree of freedom in the negotiations on what is sometimes called the “labour market” since, 
for most humans, labour power is their only commodity – if they have got any at all. Now, the 
course of capitalist development that necessitated the first varieties of the “welfare state” is also 
perpetually necessitating restrictions in the said kind of practical freedom. The liberality of 
bourgeois society is here most decisively at odds with itself. From this crucial point on, the 
compulsion to employ further measures of coercion emerges and spreads itself.  
For a social science worthy of the name, its paradigm is a critique of the existent ideological 
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superstructure. Conversely, the paradigm of a social science unworthy of the name is just that 
superstructure, by which it is transformed into ideology. But what about the existent “welfare” 
superstructure?  
The bourgeois society based on industrial production is in itself a dichotomy of the factual, 
personal freedom associated with the individual’s existence on the market, and the unfree and 
subjugated position it takes on after the market transaction, inside the factory gates. The whole 
superstructure of liberalism is dependent on the popular confusion between these two states. On 
the other hand, the bourgeois’ acknowledged juridical power inside the gates, his liberal freedom to 
rule by decree, is a relation that is accepted as a matter of course. From here springs the tendency to 
accept illiberal coercion and structures of command also in the civil society at large; the states are 
confused, and so perforce are the limits between decree and individual freedom. In such 
circumstances, one must allow that it was a rather sympathetic kind of self-criticism which was 
shown by those capitalists who, as Marx tells us, were shocked by the prospect of socialism, since 
they felt it would make the whole of society “look like a factory” (Marx 1968, 377). 
The original liberal aims became unified in a theory of history that proclaimed the possibility 
that they should once be materialized. By Kant, that thought was related to what he called the “realm 
of ends”. The idea itself, and the kind of practical demands it posited for mankind, went to seeds in 
the Malthusian framework. As is clearly shown in its Darwinian variant, Malthusianism is alien to 
any possible teleology. It concentrates on the individual’s adaptation to competitors and markets, 
with no higher aim whatsoever. The best possible adaptation still does not guarantee anything but 
a survival of the existent condition. Therefore, action here can be said to go on for its own sake, 
seemingly contingent as in a field in quantum mechanics. “Evolution” refers to nothing but change 
in the outer decorum of individuals or individual entities. 
There is a conspicuous parallel from here to the view of action that was so symptomatic of 
existentialist movements with affinity to fascism. There is also a striking resemblance to the theory 
typical of reformist socialist movements from the nineteenth century on. Bernstein’s dictum: “The 
movement is all, the end is nothing” describes it very properly. Such slogans ushered the political 
development that explains why bourgeois teleology now takes the misrepresented form of naïve 
developmental theory, why the concept of freedom degenerates to one of welfare and the concept 
of rights to one of subjugation. 
Still, bourgeois thinking has to operate with concepts of aims, freedom, and rights; it cannot 
do without them. That is the reason why it not only can never escape a critique of the constructive 
kind but is also doomed to generate it. Those concepts are ever there to be worked on.  Even for 
them, theories of a “welfare state” ultimately are counter-productive.  
III. The commodity fetish and the concept of “de-commodification”
It is now time to look more closely at the practical use of the notion of “welfare state”, and 
how it helps to generate equally ideological theses about state and civil society in modern capitalism. 
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Among the key functions of the bourgeois state is the construction and maintenance of an 
infrastructure that in tendency secures a smooth accumulation of capital. An aspect of this activity 
is to keep the working population in a fluent state so that workers can cross borders between 
production spheres as well as between individual firms, younger people become workers in the first 
place, labourers from primary sectors move into industrial occupations, and so on. 
The “welfare state” is best understood in such a background. Its “welfare” character is then 
just an aspect of tasks common to each and every bourgeois state in the history of the last three 
hundred years and, in addition, common to many an absolutist state before that – namely, the 
expropriation of the immediate producers and their subsequent continued exclusion from 
traditional forms of ownership. In this process of expropriation, which goes on continually in 
bourgeois history, older extant forms of social organisation are either changed into more functional 
ones or abolished altogether. Here the family institution is especially important, perhaps most 
closely followed by churches and other forms of religious organisation.  
Indeed, one absolute prerequisite for the establishment of the bourgeois order was the 
victorious Protestant Reformation movement, which in its tendency involved dissolution of all 
church organization as distinct from the members of the congregation. It led, as Marx pointed out 
in his critique, to a condition where religion was considered a private matter exclusively – and 
especially so in the United States, where capitalism evolved with fewer traditional obstacles than 
elsewhere. 
Given the traditional symbiosis between Catholicism and family structure and institutions, 
the rise of Protestantism necessarily led to a weakening of family ties. This development was not 
followed by any movement capable of strengthening such ties on a new basis. The temperance 
movement, the movement for sexual enlightenment, and others, rather seem to have had the effect 
of strengthening the hold of state ideology and institutions over the remnants of the traditional 
family structure. Their effects coincided with the effects of capital accumulation in general. The 
family-based system of compensation, insurance, and welfare was replaced by a state system of 
welfare, functioning as an anonymous power distributed evenly to all members of society, regardless 
of family background. (Quite in accordance with the Protestant conception of God as an absolute 
person posited in equal relation to every single member of the Church.) 
However, this element of welfare, its existence being beyond doubt, is not so important or 
so unique as to justify a theory of a separate period in capital accumulation called “welfare society”, 
implying the existence of a “welfare state”. And even less is it justified to talk about “welfare states” 
in bourgeois nations (Catholic, often) where capital accumulation has not reached a momentum 
that thoroughly does away with the family system of welfare. 
This point of view certainly is antagonistic to conceptions put forward by many a theorist 
of the “welfare state”.  However, there is no good reason to insist on using the same “welfare” label 
indiscriminately on two kinds of state as different as these. They are rather just two forms of the 
bourgeois state type – though the one definitely is more functional than the other, as regards the 
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accumulation of capital. 
Still, it is true that “welfare” theorists in later years have begun to feel the necessity of re-
evaluating the criteria for the use of the label “welfare state”. For instance, in a work by Gøsta Esping-
Andersen from 1990, it is said that “[e]very theoretical paradigm must somehow define the welfare 
state”. This somewhat hyperbolical declaration is followed up by a remark to the effect that “we 
cannot test contending arguments unless we have a commonly shared conception of the 
phenomenon to be explained” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 18). It is further underlined that “[s]ocial 
scientists have been too quick to accept nations’ self-proclaimed welfare status” (Esping-Andersen 
1990, 20). 
However, useful as such reminders may be, they scarcely touch the heart of the matter. For 
evidently, the very concept of “welfare state” is here being accepted without question, and the whole 
of Esping-Andersen’s discussion in so far rests on a petitio principii. 
This is all the worse since the work in question, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism is 
the one where Esping-Andersen most coherently describes the theory of “de-commodification”, as 
an explanans of the so-called welfare state. “De-commodification” is here seen as a result of “social 
policy”, and defined in the following way: 
[T]he concept refers to the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable 
standard of living independently of market participation. (Esping-Andersen 1990, 37) 
Of course, this definition implies a close link between “markets” and “commodities”. If a 
person is dependent on “markets”, it is indicated that she/he is “commodified” (Esping-Andersen 
1990, 21, and passim), while an independence of “markets” indicates (at least) that a subject is “de-
commodified”. 
Now, it is necessary to clarify the concepts of ‘commodities’, ‘markets’, and ‘individuals’ 
here used. To begin with, it should be noted that Esping-Andersen contends that: 
[i]n pre-capitalist societies, few workers were properly commodities in the sense that their survival 
was contingent upon the sale of their labour power. It is as markets become universal and hegemonic 
that the welfare of individuals comes to depend entirely on the cash nexus. Stripping society of the 
institutional layers that guaranteed social reproduction outside the labor contract meant that people 
were commodified. In turn, the introduction of modern social rights implies a loosening of the pure 
commodity status. De-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and 
when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market. (Esping-Andersen 1990, 
21–22). 
Here it is supposed that wage workers can be commodities. At the same time, however, quite 
another thing is said, namely that they rely on sale of labour power. Some sentences later, it is said 
that the same workers, qua “people”, are being “commodified”. 
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This leaves things decidedly unclear. If a person sells her labour power, then obviously she 
cannot herself be a commodity. On the contrary, she is a subjective entity selling a commodity. Also, 
it is in no way acceptable to relate the dependence on a cash nexus immediately to “the market”. 
Such thinking overlooks the fact that the “market” may be considered a result of a social and 
technical division of labour quite as much as vice versa. 
Esping-Andersen’s difficulties in identifying the object of commodification are clearly 
shown also in other parts of his text. We are told that in modern times “both human needs and labor 
power became commodities”, but this same process is then described as a “commodification of both 
wants and people”. Thereupon, the author presents some arguments to the effect that “workers” are 
“commodities”, even declaring this to be a Marxian point of view. Further, the author goes on to 
talk about an alleged “commodity status of the worker”, only to identify it with a third entity, 
namely, as he says, “the commodity status of labor” (quotes from Esping-Andersen 1990, 35, 36, 
and 37, passim). This last is also called (or is that a fourth variant?) “[t]he labor commodity” (Esping-
Andersen 2000, 41). 
We have already touched upon the crucial difference between the worker and his labour 
power. It is overlooked by Esping-Andersen, who evidently also confuses the concept ‘labour power’ 
with the one of ‘labour’. Labour power is the capacity or potency to “labour”, that is, to work. The 
labour itself cannot be sold (nor, of course, be a commodity), since it is a concrete (or abstract) 
activity, not given as an entity with value. It has, though, got the potency to create value. 
For Marx, the discovery of the commodity character of labour power turned the tables in 
his discussion with classical political economy. For Esping-Andersen, on the other hand, it is merely 
an expression among others. He is not giving it any priority in relation to the abovementioned 
alternatives. Rather, he subsumes it under the representation of the working subject taken as a 
commodity. This is clearly shown by at least two points in his exposition: Firstly, he contends (as we 
have seen), that “social rights” are affecting the commodity status in question, which implies that 
the commodity is thought to be a subject. Secondly, he says that “[s]imply by definition, 
commodities compete” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 44). On the contrary: competition is effectuated 
by commodity owners, and of course not by commodities per se. Esping-Andersen’s remarkable 
definitorical implication means that not only the commodity labour power but any commodity, is 
seen immediately as subject. 
In the face of this conceptual fog, critically resembling the structure of “commodity 
fetishism” as described by Marx, it is necessary to point to the equally untenable proposition that 
“human needs” or “wants” can be commodities. Under no circumstances is such a relation possible. 
In bourgeois society, needs and wants are being satisfied (tentatively, at least) by things that have 
acquired a commodity form. My need for relaxation is not a commodity, but I might try to satisfy 
it by reading a book that I have bought – no matter how absurd its contents may be. 
Esping-Andersen’s practical identification of the human subject with its objects (in 
commodity-form) naturally strips that subject of its freedom. This be said explicitly here, for the 
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author contends that the Marxian concept of the worker’s formal freedom “is a freedom behind 
prison walls, and hence fictitious” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 37). 
This involves the thought that capital accumulation essentially goes together with a 
situation where workers have no kind of freedom at all (and consequently will have to be “defended” 
against the all-pervasive pressure of “commodification”). But this is impossible since labour power 
would not be a commodity in the first place, were the workers not free to sell it. By Esping-Andersen, 
we find a crucial confusion between “having” and “being”. A wage worker cannot be a commodity 
at all. He may own or have got a commodity – primarily his labour power, his working. 
Here, it becomes plain how erroneous it is to relate the individual worker’s lack of freedom 
immediately to the “market”, as does Esping-Andersen. On the contrary, in bourgeois society, it is 
the freedom of the worker that immediately is shown through his market position. His lack of 
freedom is something immediately shown only inside the factory gates – in a position where the 
labour power is “decommodified”. 
IV. Metamorphosis of the commodity – and of society
A product is no “commodity” unless it is there to be sold. A sales act, on the one hand, is a 
buying act on the other. That being so, the universally accepted destination of any commodity is to 
be abolished as such; that is, to be transformed into an ordinary use value, which means: into 
consumption. 
Such a consumption may be individual in character. When a worker buys a sausage because 
he is determined to get it eaten, it is transformed from a commodity to a useful product, pure and 
simple. When it is consumed, it is then consumed not as a commodity, but as a use value. In its 
consumption, the product is negated as a commodity. To use the Esping-Andersen term, it has been 
“de-commodified”.  
This “de-commodification” of the sausage, and a fortiori of every commodity (for a 
commodity which is not sold, is “de-commodified” by wear and tear, by conscious destruction, or 
by being transformed into a gift), is brought about with no other institutional means than those 
inherent in the conditions under which it was produced. No political superstructure is needed here. 
If we turn to an analysis of the other significant form of consumption, namely productive 
consumption, as it is brought about by capital in the production period, a similar relation will 
appear. In fact, no commodity is consumed, but many a commodity is abolished as such as capitalist 
production starts. A welding firm making and selling commodities consisting of metal, needs 
metallic raw material, tools, and gases in its production processes. These factors are to be found on 
the market and are bought as commodities. Having been bought, they are commodities no longer; 
they simply are joined together in a process whose usefulness appears in the finished product.  
What physically brings them together in the said process, is another separate factor, namely 
human labour power. However, this power is then seen not as the static force which is its form of 
appearance on the market, but as a force being actively used, as concrete labour. Consequently, it 
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has been, and is being, “de-commodified”, like all other use values bought for productive 
consumption. Nor in this case is there any apparent need for a political superstructure to bring 
about such a result. On the contrary, “de-commodification” is a necessary aspect of capitalist 
production itself, and reveals how it is based on contradictory determinations, of which the class 
antagonism is just one among many. 
This inherent self-abolition in the commodity world is still, however, the perhaps most 
important factor when it comes to explaining the functions and tasks of the state apparatus, and 
consequently the politics adopted by the state. What Esping-Andersen calls “de-commodification” 
is simply a transitory stage in what Marx called “the metamorphosis of the commodity”. To ensure 
an efficient marketing of products, reliable and continuously functioning power sources for 
production and transport, to further the development of communications to shorten the time of 
circulation, and so on, the state has to be active and intervening. But such a state activity is then a 
function of a metamorphosis which ab ovo is essential to capital and bourgeois production. 
Consequently, it does not seem reasonable to provide it with any special epithet – “welfare” or other. 
This last remark is not only a conclusion, but also an anticipation of the result of an analysis 
of that special part of the commodity world that consists of human labour power. In 
contradistinction to all other commodities, labour power cannot possibly, and neither partly nor 
completely, be a product of a capitalist production process. However, it naturally passes through all 
stages in a commodity metamorphosis. Its “de-commodification”, a process which, as we have seen, 
is vital and essential to its continuing and steadily reproduced existence as a commodity, is a fact. We 
have looked at one of the phases in this process, namely, the “de-commodification” that the labour 
power undergoes from the point in time where its working day starts. This phase, naturally, ends 
when the working day is over. Now, since the (exchange) value of labour power is dependent on its 
having a use value, it is – for theoretical purposes – justified to say that it has not got any value at 
this moment of time: it is exhausted. Consequently, it is still in a stage of “de-commodification”. It 
now enters a new phase in its de-commodified existence: the period needed to get rehabilitated and 
recreated. A certain amount of rest, sleep and food etc. is needed. From the moment of complete 
recreation on, this individual labour power can be said to be a commodity anew. And in most cases, 
this moment is practically identical with the start of a new working day. 
Thus, all the phases of individual “de-commodification” in reality are transitory stages in a 
process of “commodification”. This is clearly seen also in other aspects of the fate of members of the 
working class. One of the implications of the “de-commodification” theory, namely that the 
“welfare” state is necessary to prevent that a part of the population becomes outcast, has a strange 
sound – not least to-day, when the pauperising effects of capital accumulation, precisely in those 
societies where the said accumulation is rendered effective by the “welfare state”, are so blatant. But 
anyway, this Pauperismus is just a traditional result of accumulation, extant from a point in time 
long before any idea of a modern “welfare state” was even conceived. It represents the lowest layers 
of the relative surplus population – the strata below the industrial reserve army, human beings 
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dysfunctional as a work force, but functional as bugbears in front of class – and self-conscious 
workers.  
In a society dominated by capital accumulation, all individual labour powers are seen as 
population elements pure and simple; they are there to be Malthusianly manipulated. Possible 
disruptions in their working careers, like illness, parenthood, old age and unemployment, are looked 
upon just as inconveniences or as periods of dysfunction, and in most cases the “welfare” system 
taking care of those who are thus disrupted, aims at making them fit for a functioning in the system 
– be it as workers or as bugbears.
By the same token, arguments to the effect that the existence of trade unions and political 
parties with working-class backgrounds all have “de-commodifying” effects, seem to be utterly 
misleading. It is by use of their “free” will that workers choose to be union members. Did they not 
have precisely this freedom, they could not function as working men possessing labour power in 
“commodified” form. A fortiori, the same is valid for the relation between workers and organizations 
of the “Labour Party” type. And naturally, it is not without significance that unions/organisations 
of this kind have had an essential role in establishing the state “welfare” structures. As regards the 
effects of trade unionising, it is fairly clear that modern production scales, with their need for 
investments of a titanic size, make capitalist entrepreneurs, as a class-group, effectively dependent 
on a unionized number of hands. And the social system so misleadingly labelled “welfare society” is 
dependent on industrial activities on this scale. 
Conceptually, the expression “labour power” contrasts with “labour”. To ascribe to labour 
power the capacity of being a commodity, must mean to deny such a capacity to “labour”, since 
these expressions are related to each other as dynameis and energeia, potentiality and actuality, 
respectively. A fortiori, this use of the concept ‘labour power’ must lead to some kind of acceptance 
of the Marxian theory of surplus value, and to acceptance of the view that free labour power is, in 
entering the production process, transformed into unfree labour. Further, since this is a 
transformation initiated by facts bound up with the commodity status of labour power, it might 
seem reasonable to expect some related transformation in the circulation of any commodity – that 
is, to expect just a metamorphosis of the kind we have tried to describe above. 
Thus, if the monstrous welfare state theory of “de-commodification” is to be upheld, one 
has to try to think of labour (not labour power) as a commodity. However, this would make us 
victims of all the well-known difficulties involved in conceiving of a fluent, value-producing entity 
that is at the same time existing as a fixed quantity of value. Hitherto, those difficulties have 
constituted an unsolved problem. 
Let us, for the sake of illustration, think of a worker who is receiving social insurance money 
from the state during a period of unemployment. That payment has not got the form of a wage and, 
consequently, one could be tempted to look at the transfer as “de-commodifying” her labour power. 
Such a temptation should be resisted. In fact, if she had not got any payment from the state 
or municipal institutions, what would have been the case? Perhaps she would starve. If so, her labour 
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power clearly is “de-commodified”, since its use value disappears abruptly. Likewise, if her working 
comrades collect money to her, making her continued existence possible, one would certainly, from 
the premises developed above, regard it as a “de-commodifying” act. 
Firstly, a problem regarding explanatory force comes to the fore here: We are looking at 
different ways of action, which all can be regarded as alternatives to the way of doing things typical 
of the “welfare state”; if these ways can reasonably  be regarded as typically effecting the same 
phenomenon as does the “welfare state” in the same circumstances, then it is difficult to see how the 
said theory (of “de-commodification”) tells us anything specific at all about the “welfare state”, 
neither about its causes, nor about its effects. 
Secondly, the form of the argument suggests that Fabianist-Malthusian aloofness makes 
itself felt: it would seem that “de-commodification”, in the theory under examination, is meant to 
indicate an act graciously performed by official “welfare” agents, whereby persons are freed from 
excesses of economic laws of the “market”: freed from starvation, freed from humiliating charity. 
However, such phenomena are not in themselves specific for the capitalist order, nor for the 
“market”, that is, for the order that the theory wishes politically to analyse. On the contrary, they are 
general, with widespread validity at least for all class societies. Again, “de-commodification” theory 
seems to be in danger of losing specialised explanatory force. 
What is worse, this factual absence of a clearly defined and determined historical object 
might lead the “de-commodification” theorist to ignore the specific, historically progressive 
function of capitalism in its totality. Such ignorance may, as already mentioned, methodically go 
together with an upholding of Darwinian evolutionary theory. In casu, it paradoxically strips the 
said theorist of precisely that object to which his leading term verbally should be best suited.  
The point is that as the capitalist mode of production develops, it organises the production 
of use values in a way that definitely frees it from the symbolic, religious and prestigious overtones 
typical of the pre-capitalist products and production processes. More than any other relation, this is 
a sign of the civilising effect of capital: 
 
Hence the great civilising influence of capital; its production of a level of society in relation to which 
all the earlier ones appear just as local developments of mankind, and as idolatry of nature. Nature 
now becomes pure object for man, pure object of utility. (Marx, 1953, 313) 
 
But, then, what is this, other than precisely the real process of “de-commodification”, so 
necessary for the metamorphoses of commodities – in this case for the transformation of labour 
power in the production process? Such metamorphoses demand the transformation of exchange 
value into its opposite, which is use value; this presupposed opposition is itself a relation which 
seems to develop towards a totality in the course of the history of capitalism. Consequently, one 
might call the modern, developed production process a “de-commodification” per se, and tentatively 
add the implication that as such, it cannot even be discovered by its own theorist. 
By such arguments, one might stress the point that capitalist production and capitalist 
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society develop in a totality where all factors are interdependent through and through. In this 
society, it is hard to discover any “de-commodification” which is not suited to the demands of 
capital. It seems to be a strange thought that the social insurance should “de-commodify” the powers 
of a worker, when the same payment makes her able to retain those powers, thus keeping her ready 
for employment and guaranteeing her possession of an exchange value (a commodity). All the more 
so, since the “welfare” state will not pay her unless she is willing to start working on the first occasion. 
Postscript: 
To receive a letter of invitation from an intelligent new journal is in itself bound to give a nice 
impression. All the more so, when at the next crossroads it accepts an article whose factual protagonist is Karl 
Marx. 
As I pointed out in an article (Sandemose 2016) on the latter’s methodological construction of 
macro-level values and prices, it is a documentable fact that common understanding of Marxian theories is at 
a deplorable level among ‘professionals’, even making possible, at least occasionally, outright grotesque 
evaluations from referees – not unusually selected by innocent-appearing, ignorant editors. If such 
conditions had prevailed in the field of general philosophy, warning signals would have been jacked up long 
ago. Economics, however, contains in it the immediate conditions of life and death for the bourgeoisie. Self-
appointed ’Marxists’ and other pseudo-revolutionaries are of course at the bottom level line of its defence. 
For, as said Frederick the Great: ‘Of all Jesuits, the Protestant ones are the worst’. 
This article was written in 1998, to an international seminar on problems relating to ‘welfare’ politics 
in Lillehammer, Norway. Restated, it was used as a chapter (entitled “The scandal in welfare theory”) in a 
book of mine from 2002. After sending it as an article to a well-groomed journal in the UK, I got a stern 
refutation, inter alia lamenting that it was “counterproductive” not to have summed up standpoints of  
“other Marxists” regarding welfare theories; furthermore, it was deplorable, I learnt, not to have checked if 
Slavoj Zizek had any viewpoints on the matter. 
I hope the reader will excuse me, but I could not refrain from using such an illustration. Elementary 
definitions, even those relating to commodities, are definitions. They are not postmodernist theses produced 
through will-o’-the-wisp reasoning. The fact that a whole welfare theory is built on internally contradictory 
definitions, does, alas, not verify it. This is not a matter for the world so popular in British coloured 
magazines. What is verified, is rather the fetishism pervading social science. 
Of course, there is a background significance for pulling out the said illustration. For more than ten 
years, a traditional capitalist production crisis and its aftermath has defined the development of the bourgeois 
world. But in the world of quasi-Marxists and they retainers, that crisis is called a “financial crisis” echoing 
the mindset of a mass of ideologists without industrial experience of real commodity production, but filled 
with phantasies of apparently exiting and charming financial “derivates” while constructing little but 
shenanigans about the power of paper assets. The relative popularity of such authors is, thank Heavens, 
diminishing. May that contribute to progressive analysis of the real forces of development in all advanced 
social forms – the concrete relations between capital and labour. 
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